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Abstract
Gödel’s ontological proof is by now well-known based on the 1970-
version, written in Gödel’s own hand, and Scott’s version of the proof.
In this paper new manuscript sources found in Gödel’s Nachlass are pre-
sented. Three versions of Gödel’s ontological proof have been transcribed,
and completed from context as true to Gödel’s notes as possible. The dis-
cussion in this paper is based on these new sources and reveals Gödel’s
early intentions of a liberal comprehension principle for the higher order
modal logic, an explicit use of second order Barcan schemas, as well as
seemingly defining a rigidity condition for the system. None of these as-
pects occur explicitly in the later 1970 version, and therefore they have
long been in focus of the debate on Gödel’s ontological proof.
Keywords: Ontological Argument, Kurt Gödel, Higher-Order Logic (03B15),
Modal Logic (03B45).
1 Introduction
In the Nachlass of Gödel there are several sketches of the ontological argument,
one of which has not been published before, and two versions that were tran-
scribed in the Appendix of the collected works of Gödel [11, Appendix B]. These
versions can be added to the known version of Gödel dated Feb 10, 1970, and
Scott’s version [21] that have been thoroughly researched and even computer
analysed and the latter verified (see [4] and related papers). In this paper we
will for the first time treat these sketches of the ontological argument as com-
plete formalizations comparable to the known versions; this is made possible
partly because of a new transcription of the notes, which has corrected some
formulas that were previously misinterpreted, and prove the theorems of these
three versions in order to show the development of Gödel’s argument.
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These three axiomatizations have been transcribed from Gabelsberger short-
hand by the second author. The notes occur in the Nachlass as formulas ap-
pended with comments in Gabelsberger. Throughout the paper the transcrip-
tion of Gödel’s original notes will be written within brackets. Footnotes will
indicate the reference to where in the Nachlass the passage is found. Box and
folder numbers refer to the originals in the Princeton archive whereas reel and
frame numbers refer to the unique identification of each page in the microfilm
version of the archive. The identification follows the inventory Finding Aid of
[12].
For the reader’s convenience, formal proofs of each version have been col-
lected into an appendix (section 10), which can be read separately from the main
paper. Sections 6–8 of the main paper contain informal proofs of each version
of the ontological argument. These informal proofs add as little as possible to
Gödel’s notes, by not explicitly specifying any formal system for the argument,
while still making steps of reasoning clearer. Some potentially questionable
properties of the formal system of the appendix are motivated by Gödel’s notes,
such as using an S5 classical system for a rigid constant domain higher order
modal logic. These properties of the intended system of the argument will be
discussed in the main paper based on Gödel’s notes. Though an axiomatic logic
with linear derivations may have been closer to Gödel’s style of writing, we will
display the formal arguments of the appendix in natural deduction style.
2 From Anselm of Canterbury to Gödel: the study
of the argument
The ontological proof dates as far back as Anselm of Canterbury (1033–1109)
and is generally considered to have reached Gödel’s awareness through his in-
terest in Leibniz’ philosophy [1, p. 389] and [22, p. 241]. In the Nachlass of
Gödel, there is a multitude of scattered notes on theology as well as material
in notebooks dedicated to the topic. However, as mentioned in [1, p. 389] little
has been found so far in Gödel’s notes on Leibniz and the ontological argument.
General information about how Gödel’s philosophy is related to Leibniz is
found in [25]. There Gödel’s biographer logician Hao Wang [25, p. 291] explains,
based on conversations with Gödel, how Gödel’s main line of philosophy aims to
construct a neo-monadology that follows Leibniz. In the chronology of [24], there
is a mention of Gödel’s Leibniz studies as occurring from 1943 to 1946. These
years are given by Gödel himself in the supplementary reply to a questionnaire
printed in full in [24, pp. 16–21]. As we shall see below, this shows that
Gödel had begun writing notes on the ontological proof prior to his systematical
Leibniz studies. Though other reports (by Karl Menger) mention an earlier
interest in Leibniz during the 1930’s [24, pp. 48–49] or [25, p. 7]. This is
also confirmed by the Nachlass, where Leibniz and Monadology are mentioned
among notes on Quantum Mechanics written in 19351.
1Box 6b, Folder 78, Reel 21, Frames from 967 and on.
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In the secondary literature on the ontological proof, the attribution of Gödel’s
proof to a study of Leibniz work is made primarily based on the plan of the
formal argument from 1970 [23, p. 115] as well as the concepts used in this
version (i.e. essence and positive properties vs. perfections). Leibniz is known
for adding to the ontological argument a proof of the compatibility of perfec-
tions. Gödel’s notes [11, Appendix B, pp. 434–435] contain a discussion of these
two concepts, positive properties and perfections, as a possible interpretation
of these. In [11, p. 389] some basic knowledge about Leibniz’ comments on
the ontological proof are explained and it is conjectured that Gödel knew about
these texts, because they were widely accessible at that time, but little concrete
evidence is given to support these claims.
The attribution of Gödel’s proof to Leibniz is supported by the discussion
between Wang and Gödel found in [24], but Wang is hesitant to address the
topic of the ontological proof, because of cultural differences [24, p. 195] and
[25, p. 129]. Nevertheless, Wang quotes Gödel, referring to this conversation
as occurring in 1972, with respect to the ontological proof as saying that “he
first got his idea of this proof in reading Leibniz” [25, p. 113]. However, this
close connection to Leibniz is denied by Gödel in about 1977 when he is making
corrections to Wang’s manuscript [25, p. 87]; “I have never obtained anything
definite on the basis of reading Leibniz. Some theological and philosophical
results have just been suggested [by his work]. One example is my ontological
proof [of the existence of God]. Dana Scott has [a copy of] the proof. It uses
the division between positive and negative properties [proposed by Leibniz].”
Though Gödel did not here attribute the ideas of his proof to anyone but Leibniz,
there are other implicit influences.
In [24, p. 18], Gödel answers the above mentioned questionnaire about his
professional background by referring to the philosophical introductory lectures
by Heinrich Gomperz as an influence to which he attributes special significance
in the development of his philosophy. The answer is confirmed in a supplemen-
tary reply that mentions only Gomperz’ lectures as an important influence.
Some early notes2 in Gödel’s Nachlass from Gomperz’ lectures dated ‘Winter
1925’, and found on the same page as the title Gomperz and the subtitle History
of European philosophy [Gomperz – Geschichte d. europ. Phil.], contain a list
of names among others Augustinus, Anselm of Canterbury, Thomas Aquinas,
William of Occam, as well as Meister Eckhart, some followed by approximate
years or a short comment. Anselm’s name has beneath it a note of ‘ontological
proof’ [(Ontol. Gottesbew.)] but this particular list ends before any mention of
Leibniz.
These particular 1925 notes of Gödel continue with some notes on the Phi-
losophy of the Renaissance3 that focus on the relationship between belief and
knowledge, which are indicated to equal the relationship between the belief sys-
tems of Plato and Aristotle [Verhältnis des Glaubens zum Wissen = Verhältnis
der Glaubenssysteme zu Plato und Aristoteles]. The notes then culminate in
2Box 6b, Folder 72.5, Reel 21, Frame 503.
3This title is from Harald Höffding’s Geschichte der neueren Philosophie Band 1. See Box
6b, Folder 72.5, Reel 21, Frames 581–582.
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a longer passage about Anselm of Canterbury where Gödel writes that Anselm
aimed to derive his system of beliefs [... die Glaubenslehre beweisen] and that
Anselm was convinced that the Church Doctrines, such as the Trinity, could
be proved as faith by him was regarded the precursor of knowledge [Anselm
von Canterbury ist überzeugt, dass alle Kirchenlehren, z.B. 3-Einigkeit, sich be-
weisen lassen. Um dieses Jahr 1200 - damals engster Zusammenhang zwischen
Glaube und Wissen - credo ut intelligam. Glaube = Vorstufe des Wissens.]
These notes seem to indicate that Gödel had a broad and early interest in
theology and the history of the ontological argument that can not be described
as a pure interest in the formal logical axiomatization, which Gödel later ex-
pressed [1]. This claim is supported by the seemingly continuous production
of theological notes made throughout his adult life. Gödel’s motivation for the
ontological proof is often related to the public opinion on Gödel’s private be-
liefs (see also [24, p. 150, 194–195, 212] or [23, Chapter IV, section 1.2.] for a
discussion of Gödel’s motivation for the ontological proof), but a motivation for
the argument can also be described as an interest in rational theology.
Other sources than Leibniz were studied by Gödel during the years when he
developed his ontological proof. As is noted in [11, p. 390] the proof of Gödel
‘shows more affinity with a type of “ontological argument” based on modern
modal logic’. In this context Charles Hartshorne’s 1962 proof published in ‘The
Logic of Perfection’ [15, pages 50–53] is mentioned by Adams as a potential
source and indeed this can be verified by Gödel’s notes. In the Nachlass4 there
is an indisputable reference to Hartshorne’s proof and that it has been stud-
ied. Gödel notes on a sheet of paper the source [Hartshorne über das ontol.
Arg., Logic of Perfection 62, p. 50–51]. The reference is preceded by some
formal notes related to Hartshorne’s proof and followed by a few lines of notes
in Gabelsberger. Evidently, this is another source that influenced the develop-
ment of Gödel’s ontological argument. Though, Hartshorne and his ontological
argument are in [25, p. 146] severely, but broadly, criticised by Gödel on logical
grounds.
As it is known that Gödel read Kant as early as 1922, it should also be taken
into account that he certainly new Kant’s objections against the ontological ar-
gument. For detailed information concerning Kant’s objections, see for example
[15, pp. 44] or [16, pp. 208].
3 Gödel on propositions and principles of deduc-
tion
Much secondary work on Gödel’s ontological proof centres around the develop-
ment of an adequate formal system in which the ontological argument makes
sense. Part of this approach is dealing with the potential modal collapse of
this system. The modal collapse is defined by A Ñ lA being provable for all
formulas A in the system. The modal collapse was first pointed out in works by
4Box 10b, Folder 49, Reel 38, Frame 383–384.
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Sobel [22, p. 253] and [23, Ch. IV, sec. 6]. Subsequent development has taken
various paths (1) emendations of the axioms (such as [2] and [7], or Hájek’s [14]
emendation that is based on Gödel’s philosophical notes), (2) cautious compre-
hension principles [13], or (3) a distinction between intensional and extensional
types where essence and positivity are interpreted extensionally (which implies
rigidity) [9, Ch. 11, sec. 9] and [4]. The general outset seems to be that the
philosophical implications of a modal collapse reduce the interest in the argu-
ment, but also Gödel’s own contested intentions seem to matter (see for example
[1, pp. 399–402], [9, Ch. 11, sec. 9] or [19]).
A consensus on Gödel’s views and how to best interpret his wishes does not
exist. A general agreement seems to exist on the formal level but that too only
when all details are explicit enough to be computer analysed [6]. The standard
proof of modal collapse relates to the definition of properties in the system, if
the comprehension principle that generates properties is very inclusive, then the
modal system collapses to a higher-order non-modal system. Some suggestions
of ‘natural’ restrictions on properties that would exclude closed sentences have
been proposed in [18]. However, this proposed restriction is apparently made
only based on an analysis of Gödel’s 1970-notes and Scott’s version. As seen
below, in section 7, there is clear evidence for a broad interpretation of what
comprises a property in Gödel’s intended sense. There, not only the God prop-
erty is stated as being positive (Th. 1), but the existence of God as well as the
necessary existence of God are stated as being positive properties (Th. 3). Also
in the version given in section 6 there is a definition of Apxq, being in fact a
closed sentence without free occurrences of x, which is assumed to be a positive
property in (Th. 2). However, these kinds of properties completely disappear
from Gödel’s notes towards the 1970-version.
Other debates, spurred by solutions to the modal collapse [9, Ch. 7, sec.
3], include a debate of the behaviour of modalities in the context of quantifiers.
The choice of constant or varying domains in the possible worlds corresponds to
philosophical preferences, and in the formal setting whether to accept Barcan
and converse Barcan formulas as allowed principles of deduction. In section 7
below, Gödel explicitly motivates equivalences in (Df. 4) by proving the converse
Barcan formula (N rpxqApxqs Ą pyqNApyq). In the context of a symmetric
accessibility relation, where the modal axiom B holds, the converse Barcan
formula will be equivalent to the Barcan formula itself [8, Sec. 7]. As KB is a
sufficient system for versions of Gödel’s ontological proof [17], this will be the
case for modal systems of the proof even if they are weaker than S5. This seems
to suggest that Gödel intended a constant domain interpretation.
It is clear from the notes of Gödel that he considered multiple general prin-
ciples of modal reasoning, in relation to the ontological proof, and rejected for
example a Barcan-like principle. On two numbered sheets of paper5, of which
the first states that they should be filed under the papers concerning the onto-
logical proof [kommt zu ontol. Bew], the second sheet contains a Barcan-like
principle NpDxqKpxq Ą pDxqNKpxq. The formula is preceded by a question
5Box 10b, Folder 49, Reel 38, Frame 379–380.
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mark and followed by a note that it apparently is not valid [offenbar nicht].
As for another hot topic: the potential rigidity of names that was treated
at length in [9, Ch. 9, sec. 2–3]. Rigidity means philosophically that the de
dicto/de re distinction vanishes and formally that the de dicto use of modalities
N rxλx.ϕpxqypyqs, which necessitates a sentence, is equivalent to the de re use of
modalities xλx.Nϕpxqypyq, which ascribes a necessary property to an object. If
we for a property write ϕ for short, then the equivalence of the properties Nϕ ”
x̂rNϕpxqs, stated as (Df. 3) in section 7 below, suggests that the definiendum is
de dicto and the definiens is de re, corresponding to a rigidity condition exactly
as given in [9, Def. 9.5.1].
However, note that this condition is used in the version of section 7, for axiom
3: P pϕq ą P pNϕq, which also occurs as axiom 2 in the earlier version of section
6, but this axiom was changed for the 1970-version into P pϕq Ñ NP pϕq (see
also the discussion in section 7) which entails only the rigidity of positiveness
[4, sec. 4]. Therefore, any particular claims about rigidity may apply only to
the earlier versions of the ontological proof, given in this paper, but could have
been rejected or refined for the later 1970-version. As a conclusion one may at
least note, without anachronistic assumptions, that the issue of rigidity was to
some extent considered by Gödel himself.
4 Gödel on equality and being
Secondary work on Gödel’s ontological argument faces problems, not only be-
cause of Gödel’s informal use of a logical system, but also the logical language
has to be deduced from context. When it comes to the formal language of
Gödel’s ontological proof, equality is generally included because it occurs in an
example of a positive property in Gödel’s own 1970-version as well as in the
Scott-version. The notion of equality in higher-order systems can be axiomatic
by including it as primitive or defined through Leibniz’ Law. By this definition,
a “ b ”Df p@ϕqrϕpaq Ø ϕpbqs
the equality notion reduces to equivalence between formulas. The definition can
be described as stating replacement of equals in properties, in one direction,
and in the other direction (which is more problematic) it states identity of
indiscernibles. The latter direction, which stems from Leibniz’ philosophy, is a
convenient way of avoiding a primitive extensional equality.
In the Nachlass Gödel repeatedly returns to the interpretation of positive
properties. In the notes [11, Appendix B, pp. 432–433], Gödel sketches axioms
for the positive and negative properties. Noteworthy is axiom 4 which states
that being is positive [Das Sein ist positiv]. This axiom can be formalized and
is used in section 6 below of the ontological proof. The axiom can be seen as
a base case for an axiomatic generation of an inductive set. The positivity of
being, formalized through the equality predicate, is no stranger to the argument.
It occurs in Gödel’s 1970 notes but there as a consequence of the replacement
axiom for the positivity predicate based on necessary entailment. It also occurs
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as a provable property, from the same axiom as in Gödel’s notes, in Scott’s
version of the ontological proof. There it is used to produce a contradiction
in the proof that positive properties are possibly exemplified (Scott’s Theorem
1). As was noted in [17, Section 5] the reliance on the equality predicate is not
actually required in Scott’s version. There is a proof without equality in the
language, which is no surprise because Gödel’s 1970-version does not rely on the
equality predicate either, but only seems to reflect on equality as an explanation
of the intended set of positive properties or as a reflection on how the positive
properties correspond to the intended language. Clearly, Gödel intended for
equality to play a role in his proof as a positive property.
In some other notes (see [11, pp. 434–435]), Gödel axiomatizes the positive
properties as perfectives through: (1) A property is a perfective if and only
if it implies no negation of a perfective, (2) the necessity of a perfective is a
perfective, and (3) being is a perfective. This passage is continued in a footnote
where Gödel states that it is enough to assume that there is a perfective, because
being as a perfective then becomes provable. Then follows an interpretation of
positives as assertions or tautologies with a comparison of the axiomatization.
This passage is followed by a, much debated, note where Gödel motivates his
preferred axiomatization. Gödel states that taking the formula
P pϕq Ñ P pNϕq (1)
as an axiom (as is done in the sections 6 and 7 below) is an essential presup-
position for the ontological proof. Taking the implication ϕpxq Ą Nϕpxq as an
assumption he calls the inferior way [der schlechte Weg], because the ontological
proof then follows from compatibility of the positive properties or rather com-
patibility of any system of properties. These MaxPhil notes relate, by comparing
the dates, to the version of section 7 (see the discussion in section 7). Note that
these passages have motivated several emendations [3, p. 170] and [14, Section
3]. The former uses exactly this formula (1) as axiom (A6’), but interprets ‘das
Sein ist positiv’ through essences. The latter emendation works in a system
with full comprehension but avoids modal collapse through the modification of
the axioms.
Gödel considers (see [11, Appendix B, pp. 432–433]) being a property that
is even philosophically the cause of the world [Das Bejahen des Seins ist die
Ursache der Welt], though the fundamental philosophical concept is cause [Der
philosophische Grundbegriff ist die Ursache]. In the same passage, he equates
properties with the cause of the discernibility of things [Eigenschaft = Ursache
der Verschiedenheit von Dingen]. This could be a philosophical motivation for
a treatment of apartness through a Leibnizian definition.
Another note that occurs at least twice (though in slightly different form)
in the Nachlass6 is the formal statement
x ­“ y ą Dϕ.rϕpxq ^  ϕpyqs (2)
6Folder 10b, Box 49, Reel 38, Frames 379–380.
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This statement claims that apartness of objects necessarily implies discernibility.
In one of the occurrences7 a third conjunct is added by which the property ϕ
is an essential property [ϕ ist eine ess. Eigenschaft]. However, this note is
preceded by a question mark. In the other occurrence8 the formula is followed
by a note that this property ϕ does not need to be directly perceivable [Aber
dieses ϕ braucht nicht rein begrifflich zu sein.] This seems to indicate that he
is considering this to be a classical existence and not a constructive one. As
an intuitionistic basic concept, apartness may be preferred, as the concept was
introduced in place of an equality relation by Brouwer, but classically treated,
this implication (2) is equivalent to Leibniz’ formula of identity of indiscernibles.
Therefore, it seems to be motivated to treat equality in its Leibniz formula-
tion when it concerns Gödel’s ontological proof. In appendix 10 we will, when
giving the full formal proofs, use the basic calculus NDK from [17] that has
exactly this feature.
5 Axiomatizations in Gödel’s Nachlass
Just like the notes on theological history are scattered through the Nachlass
there are more formal notes on the ontological proof than what is generally
recognized. We will here mention three versions of Gödel’s ontological proof that
predate the known two page notes dated Feb 10, 1970 [11]. The 1970-version is
a basis for the Scott-version of the proof [21], but the latter differs slightly from
the version of Gödel. The main differences are that the positivity of God is taken
as an axiom and that a missing conjunct from the definition of essence, stating
that the essence-property is satisfied by the object, is added. The latter addition
has been concluded to be vital for the consistency of the axiomatization [4], but
this was unknown to Scott at the time (as stated in personal correspondence
to the authors and C. Benzmüller). The former alteration of the argument was
initiated by Scott who considered it a natural improvement of the axiomatization
(see [4, sec. 2.3] for details concerning Scott’s version).
However, the missing conjunct of the essence-property was not purely in-
vented by Scott. As is commonly noted by scholars, the conjunct is missing in
Gödel’s 1970 notes, but does occur in the definition of essence found in Gödel’s
notes [11, Appendix B]. These notes were published in the Collected Works of
Gödel but have not, to our knowledge, been treated before as a complete formal
axiomatization of the ontological argument. Note however, that the concept of
essence only appears in the third of these versions, conjectured to be the latest
of these.
The axioms relevant for the versions of sections 6 and 8 have been deduced
from context, and do not appear in connection to the stated theorems, but
do appear elsewhere in Gödel’s notes. Gödel uses multiple notations for pos-
itivity of properties (P pϕq and ϕ P `) as well as multiple standard notations
for implication. For the notation of intuitionistic implication Gödel uses the
7Folder 10b, Box 49, Reel 38, Frame 380.
8Folder 10b, Box 49, Reel 38, Frame 379.
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Ą, whereas the notation for classical implication is Ñ. Gödel also defines a
necessary implication for which he uses the ą symbol.
6 Version No. 1
The ca. 1941 version of the ontological proof occurs in Gödel’s notes9 and has
previously been transcribed in [11, Appendix B, p. 429]. The transcriptions
differ in the formulas (Df. 3 and Th. 2), because in these notes Gödel has
corrected some symbols by writing on top of previous notations while obviously
forgetting to correct the notation elsewhere. Which notations are the intended
ones has here been deduced from context. The axioms that are listed below
and used in the proofs of the theorems are preceded by a star (*), because they
do not occur in connection to these notes. The relevant axioms are standard
axioms (Ax. 1) that also occur in the 1970-version, (Ax. 2) states that the
‘necessity of a perfective is a perfective,’ written in notes on the philosophy
of the ontological proof, (Ax. 3) is equivalent to axiom 1 of Scott’s version
(both the uncontroversial, so called ‘good direction,’ and the controversial, ‘bad
direction,’ of the implication), and (Ax. 4) is a formalization of ‘the positivity of
being’. The definitions include the second order predicate Φ, Φpϕq representing
the necessary exemplification of the predicate ϕ.
Axioms
*Ax. 1: P pϕq . ϕ ĄN ψ Ñ P pψq
*Ax. 2: P pϕq Ñ P pNϕq
*Ax. 3: P pϕq Ø „P p„ϕq
*Ax. 4: P px̂px “ xqq “Das Sein ist positiv”
Definitions
Df. 1: G ” x̂ rpϕq rϕ P ` Ñ ϕpxqss
Df. 2: Φpϕq ” NpDxqϕpxq
Df. 3: Apxq ” pDϕq rpxq rϕpxq ”N Gpxqs .Φpϕqs
Theorems
Th. 1: Gpxq . ϕ P ` Ñ ϕpxq
Th. 2: A P ` Ñ ΦpGq
Th. 3: pDxqGpxq Ñ NpDxqGpxq
9Box 12, Folder 41, Reel 46, Frame 333.
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6.1 Proofs
The proofs of the theorems can be informally sketched using linear Gödel-style
deductions. The proof of (Th.2) uses the second order Barcan schema as an
allowed principle of reasoning.
Proof of Th.1
1. Gpxq Ñ pϕqrϕ P ` Ñ ϕpxqs Df.1
2. Gpxq Ñ ϕ P ` Ñ ϕpxq @ Ex.
3. Gpxq . ϕ P ` Ñ ϕpxq propositional reasoning
Proof of Th.2
4. A P ` ÑMpDxqApxq as usual
5. A P ` ÑMpDxqpDϕq rpxq rϕpxq ”N Gpxqs .Φpϕqs Df. A
6. A P ` ÑMpDϕq rpxq rϕpxq ”N Gpxqs .Φpϕqs first order Th.
7. A P ` Ñ pDϕqM rpxq rϕpxq ”N Gpxqs .Φpϕqs Barcan
8. A P ` Ñ pDϕq rMpxq rϕpxq ”N Gpxqs .MΦpϕqs Mpa.bq Ñ pMa.Mbq
9. A P ` Ñ pDϕq rpxq rϕpxq ”N Gpxqs .Φpϕqs Barcan, MNaÑ Na
10. A P ` Ñ ΦpGq
Proof of Th.3
11. Gpxq Ñ pxqrGpxq ”N Gpxqs.pDxqGpxq straightforward
12. Gpxq Ñ pẑ.rpxqrGpxq ”N Gpxqs.pDxqGpxqsqx
13. Gpxq Ñ pẑ.rpxqrGpxq ”N Gpxqs.pDxqGpxqsq P ` God has only pos. properties.
14. Gpxq Ñ pẑ.N rpxqrGpxq ”N Gpxqs.pDxqGpxqsq P ` Ax. 2
15. Gpxq Ñ pẑ.rpxqrGpxq ”N Gpxqs.NpDxqGpxqsq P ` distribution of N
16. Gpxq Ñ pẑ.pDϕqrpxqrϕpxq ”N Gpxqs.NpDxqϕpxqsq P ` D intr. and Ax. 1
17. pDxqGpxq Ñ A P ` Df. 3
18. pDxqGpxq Ñ NpDxqGpxq Th. 2 and Df. 2.
7 Version No. 2
The last page10 of this version has a note on the side of the page that dates
it to 1952–53 [Siehe auch Heft über Max., Seaside Heights, ca. 52 oder 53].
This comment was apparently added later by Gödel. Compared to the Max.
notebooks, MaxPhil 14 was written between 1946 and 1955, so this is the one in
question. The comments about the ontological proof start at p. 103. On p. 101 it
says "Asbury Park 1954," so the comments were written in (or after) 1954. This
means that the MaxPhil14 comments relate to this 52/53-version. For example
Gödel writes (p. 107) "Dass die Notwendigkeit einer pos. Eigenschaft pos. ist,
ist die wesentliche Voraussetzung für den ontol. Bew." This axiom (stated below
as Ax. 3) was important for the first two versions occurring in this paper but
changed for the 1970-version (into P pϕq Ñ NP pϕq).
10Box 12, Folder 41, Reel 46, Frame 336.
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In this version of the ontological proof, the axioms and theorems below occur
as such in Gödel’s Nachlass11. The definitions have, for a clear presentation,
been reconstructed based on Gödel’s axioms and theorems for this version. Note
that ∆A denotes the first-order property of having all the properties sharing
the second-order property A. The notes are clearly written and the theorems
describe small steps of reasoning that are transparent. Therefore, no informal
proofs are given, but the reader may consult the appendix of this paper for a
formal derivation of each theorem.
Axioms
Ax 1. P pϕq. ϕ ą ψ . ą P pψq Notw.
Ax 2. pϕq rApϕq Ą P pϕqs ą P p∆Aq Notw.
Ax 3. P pϕq ą P pNϕq
Ax 4. P pϕq Ą „P p„ϕq
Definitions
Df 1. Φpxq. ” .pϕq rP pϕq Ą ϕpxqs
Df 2. ∆A ” x̂ rpψq rApψq Ą ψpxqss
Df 3. Nϕ ” x̂ rNϕpxqs
Df 4. ϕ ą ψ. ” .Npxq rϕpxq Ą ψpxqs . ” .Npxq rϕpxq ą ψpxqs
da N rpxqApxq Ą Apyqs,
N rpxqApxqs Ą NApyq
Ą pyqNApyq
Theorems
Th 0. ϕ ”e ψ . P pϕq. ą P pψq
Th 1. P pΦq
Th 2. Φpxq ą pDyqΦpyq
Th 3. P px̂pDyqΦpyqq, NP rx̂NpDyqΦpyqs
Th 4. Φpxq ą pP rx̂NpDyqΦpyqs Ą NpDyqΦpyqq
Th 5. Φpxq ą NpDyqΦpyq
Th 6. pDyqΦpyq ą NpDyqΦpyq
Th 7. MpDyqΦpyq ą NpDyqΦpyq
Th 8. NpDyqΦpyq
Th 9. P pϕq ĄMpDxqϕpxq,
da „MpDxqϕpxq . Ą ϕ ą ψ,
da Npxq rϕpxq Ą ψpxqs.
Also P pϕq . „MpDxqϕpxq Ą pψqP pψq.
It should be noted that the intended proof of the main Th. 8 can be signifi-
cantly simplified. Instead of proving Th. 8 using Th. 9 note that it is possible
to prove Th. 4 without the condition Φpxq. To this end, prove the right hand
11Box 12, Folder 41, Reel 46, Frames 335–336.
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side (conclusion) of Th. 4, using Th. 9 and MNa Ñ Na, which is valid in S5.
Finally, detach Th. 8 by using Th. 3b.
8 Version No. 3
The date of this version is unknown. It has previously been transcribed in
[11, Appendix B, p. 430], but here we treat it as a full axiomatization with
some corrections in the transcription. The axioms have been added, but (Ax.
1) is referred to in Gödel’s motivation for (Th. 1) and (Ax. 2) is a standard
implication that follows from earlier stated definitions of God. The German
notes on the righthand side of the formulas are Gödel’s own.
It can be noted that the property essence and its definition does not occur
in the versions above (sections 6 and 7). However, it does occur in this version
below. Therefore, it seems that this concept was integrated into the ontological
proof at a later stage perhaps as a consequence of his studies of Leibniz that
occurred between 1943 and 1946.
In this proof the notation Essx is used by Gödel both as a first order property
and in the definition in his second footnote as a higher order property. However,
by a standard proof any two essences of an object can be proved to be necessarily
equivalent and thereby the essence of any object is unique. The use of essence
as a predicate here can be compared to the 1970 version, which takes Ess
as a binary relation between predicates and objects, and refines the definition




*Ax. 2: Gpxq Ą pϕqpPospϕq Ą ϕpxqq
Definitions
Df. 1: Gpxq ”Df x ist Gott
Df. 2: NEpxq ”Df NpDyqEssxpyq notwendige Existenz
Theorems
Th. 1: Gpxq Ą NEpxq da NE eine pos. Eigenschaft ist
Th. 212:Gpxq Ą .Essx Ą G b (gilt für jede Eigenschaft statt G)
Th. 3: Gpxq Ą NpDyqGpyq (folgt aus den 3 Vorgehenden)
pDxqGpxq Ą NpDyqGpyq
MpDxqGpxq ĄMNpDyqGpyq (beidseitiges Hinzufügen von M)
daher
Th. 4: MpDxqGpxq Ą NpDyqGpyq
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Gödel’s Notes
Ebenso folgt: Wenn der Begriff notwendige Existenz widerspruchsfrei ist, so
gibt es Dinge, für die er gilt.
b Dazu braucht man, dass alle Eigenschaften Gottes durch eine Eigenschaft
2. Typs definiert sind. [Das muss überhaupt die Definition der Essenz sein.]
Oder Essx definiert durch: ϕεEssx ” pψq tψpxq Ą .Npxq rϕpxq Ą ψpxqsu . ϕpxq
8.1 Proofs
Proof of Th.1
1. Gpxq Ą pϕqrPospϕq Ą ϕpxqs Ax.2
2. Gpxq Ą PospNEq Ą NEpxq @ Ex.
3. Gpxq Ą NEpxq 2./Ax.1
Proof of Th.2 If Essx is an essence of x:
4. pψqrψpxq Ą NpyqrEssxpyq Ą ψpyqss by Df.
5. Gpxq Ą NpyqrEssxpyq Ą Gpyqs @ Ex., “Gilt für jede Eigenschaft statt G”
6. Gpxq Ą pEssx Ą Gq abbreviation, overloading Ą
Note that Gödel uses Essx both as a name for an essence and (in his second
footnote) as a higher order predicate.
Proof of Th.3
7. Gpxq Ą NpDyqEssxpyq Th.1 / Df.2
8. Gpxq Ą NpyqrEssxpyq Ą Gpyqs Th.2
9. Gpxq Ą N rpDyqEssxpyq Ą pDyqGpyqs 8./ first order theorem: @pAÑ Bq Ñ DAÑ DB
10. Gpxq Ą NpDyqGpyq 7./9.
Proof of Th.4 As usual.
9 Conclusions
Gödel’s Nachlass offers multiple axiomatizations of the ontological argument as
well as even further possible axiomatizations based on the philosophical notes.
We have presented three complete versions of Gödel’s ontological proof based
on explicit notes in his Nachlass. Gödel’s 1970 axiomatization has previously
led to known emendations of the axioms that claim to better correspond to
our intuitions about the defined notions and that do not lead to the modal
collapse of the system. As we have shown, Gödel worked on the ontological
proof during his whole adult life, and came into contact with it as early as
1925. The axiomatizations of Gödel show how he experimented with the formal
12The second Ą, written on top, was originally the symbol =. Probably Gödel’s second
footnote relates to the “-version.
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axioms, and weighed the potential axioms based on his philosophical preferences,
touching upon several topics in the current debate on his proof. The 1970-
version can still be considered a final version, because Gödel expressed that he
was satisfied with the proof (mentioned in Morgenstern’s diary, see [1]), which
was a work in progress during the writing of the earlier notes. However, the
notes show how the proof developed formally based on a rough philosophical
direction for the work.
10 Appendix: Formal proofs in a natural deduc-
tion system
We will prove the theorems of each version of the ontological proof in the natural
deduction calculus of [17]. The calculus is, as noted in the mentioned paper,
an extension of a standard non-modal higher-order natural deduction calculus
taken from [5]. The calculus can be regarded as a minimalistic calculus for a
rigid higher-order modal logic K without extensionality principles. Stronger
modal logics can be obtained by adding axioms/rules for specific systems (such
as KB or S5). We will following Gödel use a classical S5 system. It can
be noted that the calculus does not restrict the comprehension principle used,
hence it has the flaw of having full comprehension that entails modal collapse,
but with the benefit of being close to the language of theorem provers.
We will use below modal axiom 4: lA Ñ llA, which corresponds to
transitivity in the model, and modal axiom B˚ : 3lA Ñ A (B˚ is sometimes
referred to as Brouwer’s reduction principle and can be derived from a standard
formulation of axiom B : A Ñ l3A), which corresponds to symmetry in the
model, as well as modal axiom M: lAÑ A, which corresponds to reflexivity in
the model. An additional reference is made to a point where a Barcan schema
is used. This schema is, however, provable within our system, because we have
constant domains, but it is pointed out in order to clarify that this is in fact an
accepted way of reasoning that occurs in Gödel’s notes.
A dotted line refers to an unfolding of definitions and double lines to short-
ened passages of already clear reasoning. The intuitionistic negation symbol „
has been replaced with a classical  -symbol, the classical implication symbol
Ñ is used throughout the proofs, the N for necessity and M for possibility
have been replaced by l and 3, and the dot-notation for conjunction has been
replaced with a ^-symbol. All these notations follow the style of the given
calculus. In addition the symbol ą is used for a necessitated implication.
10.1 Variant 1 of the ontological proof
Th. 1:
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rω : Gpxq ^ ϕ P `s1
^E
ω : Gpxq. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
ω : ϕ P ` Ñ ϕpxq
rω : Gpxq ^ ϕ P `s1
^E































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































rω : Gpxqs1. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Df. 1
ω : pϕqpP pϕq Ñ ϕpxqq
ω : P p pDxqGpxqq Ñ  pDxqGpxq rω : P p pDxqGpxqqs2
ω :  pDxqGpxq
ω : K
ÑI,2
ω :  P p pDxqGpxqq
Ax. 3
ω : P ppDxqGpxqq
ω : pxqrGpxq ”N Gpxqs ^ pDxqGpxq P `
Ax. 2
ω : lrpxqrGpxq ”N Gpxqs ^ pDxqGpxqs P `
ω : rpxqrGpxq ”N Gpxqs ^lpDxqGpxqs P `
ω : pDϕqrpxqrϕpxq ”N Gpxqs ^lpDxqϕpxqs P `. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Df. 3
ω : A P `
Th. 2
ω : A P ` Ñ ΦpGq
ω : ΦpGq. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Df. 2
ω : lpDxqGpxq
ÑI,1
ω : pDxqGpxq Ñ lpDxqGpxq
10.2 Variant 2 of the ontological proof
Th. 0:
rω : ϕ ”e ψ ^ P pϕqs
1
ω : ϕ ”e ψ
ω : ϕ ą ψ
rω : ϕ ”e ψ ^ P pϕqs
1
ω : P pϕq
ω : ϕ ą ψ ^ P pϕq
Ax 1.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
ω : ϕ ą ψ ^ P pϕq ą P pψq
Modal ax. M
ω : ϕ ą ψ ^ P pϕq Ñ P pψq
ÑE
ω : P pψq
ÑI,1
ω : ϕ ”e ψ ^ P pϕq Ñ P pψq
lI
ω : ϕ ”e ψ ^ P pϕq ą P pψq
Th. 1:
Ax 2.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
ω : pAqtpϕqrApϕq Ñ P pϕqs ą P p∆Aqu
@E
ω : pϕqrP pϕq Ñ P pϕqs ą P p∆P q
Modal ax. M
ω : pϕqrP pϕq Ñ P pϕqs Ñ P p∆P q
rω : rP pϕqs1
ÑI,1
ω : P pϕq Ñ P pϕq
@I
ω : pϕqrP pϕq Ñ P pϕqs
ÑE
ω : P p∆P q. . . . . . . . . . . .





ω : Φpxq Ñ pDyqΦpyq
lI




ω : Φpxq ą pDyqΦpyq
ω : Φ ą x̂pDyqΦpyq
Th 1.
ω : P pΦq
ω : Φ ą x̂pDyqΦpyq ^ P pΦq
Ax 1.
ω : P px̂pDyqΦpyqq
Th. 3b:
Df 3.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
ω : pϕqplϕ ” x̂rlϕpxqsq
@E
ω : lx̂pDyqΦpyq ” x̂lpDyqΦpyq
Th 3.
ω : P px̂pDyqΦpyqq
Ax 3.
ω : P plx̂pDyqΦpyqq
ω : lx̂pDyqΦpyq ” x̂lpDyqΦpyq ^ P plx̂pDyqΦpyqq
Th 0.




rω : Φpxqs1. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
ω : pϕqrP pϕq Ñ ϕpxqs
@E
ω : P px̂lpDyqΦpyqq Ñ lpDyqΦpyq
ÑI,1
ω : Φpxq Ñ pP px̂lpDyqΦpyqq Ñ lpDyqΦpyqq
lI
ω : Φpxq ą pP px̂lpDyqΦpyqq Ñ lpDyqΦpyqq
Th. 5:
Th. 4.
ω : Φpxq ą pP px̂lpDyqΦpyqq Ñ lpDyqΦpyqq rω : Φpxqs1
ω : P px̂lpDyqΦpyqq Ñ lpDyqΦpyq
Th. 3b.
ω : lP px̂lpDyqΦpyqq
Modal ax. M
ω : P px̂lpDyqΦpyqq
ω : lpDyqΦpyqq
ÑI,1
ω : Φpxq Ñ lpDyqΦpyq
lI





ω : Φpxq ą lpDyqΦpyq
Modal ax. M






ω : pDyqΦpyq Ñ lpDyqΦpyq
lI







ω : pDyqΦpyq ą lpDyqΦpyq
lE
ν : pDyqΦpyq Ñ lpDyqΦpyq
ν : lpDyqΦpyq
Th. 6.
ν : pDyqΦpyq ą lpDyqΦpyq. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
ν : lppDyqΦpyq Ñ lpDyqΦpyqq
Modal ax. K







ω : 3pDyqΦpyq Ñ lpDyqΦpyq
lI
ω : 3pDyqΦpyq ą lpDyqΦpyq
Th. 8:
Th. 1
ω : P pΦq
Th. 9
ω : P pϕq Ñ 3pDxqϕpxq
@I
ω : pϕqrP pϕq Ñ 3pDxqϕpxqs
@E




ω : 3pDyqΦpyq ą lpDyqΦpyq
Modal ax. M
ω : 3pDyqΦpyq Ñ lpDyqΦpyq
ω : lpDyqΦpyq
Th. 9:
rω : P pϕqs1
rω :  3pDxqϕpxqs2. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
ω : lpxq ϕpxq
µ : pxq ϕpxq





µ : ϕpxq Ñ ψpxq
µ : pxqrϕpxq Ñ ψpxqs
ω : lpxqrϕpxq Ñ ψpxqs. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
ω : ϕ ą ψ
ω : P pϕq ^ pϕ ą ψq
Ax.1
ω : P pψq
@I
ω : pψqP pψq
@E
ω : P p ϕq
rω : P pϕqs1
Ax. 4. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
ω : P pϕq Ñ  P p ϕq
ÑE
ω :  P p ϕq
ω : K
ÑI,2




ω : P pϕq Ñ 3pDxqϕpxq
Note: Above we have followed Gödel’s outline of how to prove the main Th. 8
relying on the subsequent Th. 9. See the end of section 7 for a hint of a shorter
proof.
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10.3 Variant 3 of the ontological proof
Th. 1:
Ax. 1. . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
ω : PospNEq
Ax. 2. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
ω : Gpxq Ñ pϕqpPospϕq Ñ ϕpxqq rω : Gpxqs1
ÑE
ω : pϕqpPospϕq Ñ ϕpxqq
@E




ω : Gpxq Ñ NEpxq
Th. 2:
Th. 1
ω : Gpxq Ñ NEpxq rω : Gpxqs1




ω : pDϕqrϕ P ESSx ^ pDyqϕpyqs
^E
ω : ϕ P ESSx. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
ω : pψqtψpxq Ñ lpyqrϕpyq Ñ ψpyqsu ^ ϕpxq
^E
ω : pψqtψpxq Ñ lpyqrϕpyq Ñ ψpyqsu
@E
ω : Gpxq Ñ lpyqrϕpyq Ñ Gpyqs rω : Gpxqs1
ÑE
ω : lpyqrϕpyq Ñ Gpyqs
ÑI,1
ω : Gpxq Ñ lpyqrϕpyq Ñ Gpyqs
ω : Gpxq Ñ lpyqpEssx Ñ Gq
rω : Gpxq Ñ pyqpEssx Ñ Gqs
Th. 3:
Th. 1
ω : Gpxq Ñ NEpxq rω : Gpxqs1





ω : Gpxq Ñ lpEssx Ñ Gq rω : Gpxqs
1
ω : lpEssx Ñ Gq
lE
ν : pyqpEssxpyq Ñ Gpyqq
@E
















ν : Gpxq Ñ lpDyqGpyq









ω : 3pDxqGpxq Ñ lpDyqGpyq
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